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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the phenomenon of speed-up in the context of theories
of truth. We focus on axiomatic theories of truth extending Peano arithmetic. We are particularly
interested on whether conservative extensions of PA have speed-up and on how this relates to a
deflationist account. We show that disquotational theories have no significant speed-up, in contrast
to some compositional theories, and we briefly assess the philosophical implications of these results.
§1. Introduction. Axiomatic theories of truth have become increasingly popular, and
there is a wide variety of different theories.1 There are also different ways of comparing
and categorizing the theories . One way of comparison is via their proof-theoretic strength.
In the realm of truth theories based on an arithmetical theory of syntax, this is understood
as the number of arithmetical theorems that are provable. One of the negative aspects of
comparing the proof-theoretic strength is that it is coarse-grained. For example, all con-
servative extensions of the base theory will be taken on a par. A more fine-grained way of
comparison is via interpretability relations.2
In this paper, we will take a different route for comparing an axiomatic theory of truth
with its base theory. Besides the questions of conservativity and interpretability, one can in-
vestigate whether the introduction of a truth predicate allows for a simplification of proofs.
This is a difficult question in general, but there is at least one aspect of simplification that
allows for a formal investigation, namely the length of proofs. It is possible to investigate
whether theories of truth allow for shorter proofs of arithmetical theorems.
The investigation of length of proofs started with Gödel (1936). In his short paper, Gödel
states that there is arbitrary speed-up in cases of arithmetic if you go from a logic of order n
to order n + 1.3 A very famous case of speed-up results concerns proof systems: although
a first-order sequent calculus allows for cut elimination there is a price to pay: without a
cut rule, there are theorems for which the proofs are significantly longer than in a sequent
calculus with cut.4 Most interesting for our purpose are speed-up theorems established by
Solovay, showing that even in the case of conservative extensions a significant speed-up is
Received: September 19, 2013.
1 For an overview, consult Halbach (2011).
2 A relevant interpretability relation is relative interpretability going back to Tarski et al. (1953).
Relative interpretability is based on a translation that preserves the logical structure of formulas.
Moreover, theorems of the interpreted theory are translated into theorems of the interpreting
theory. A promising variant in truth contexts is the notion of truth definability suggested by
Fujimoto (2010).
3 Gödel’s paper does not contain a proof of the claim. A proof can be found in Buss (1994).
4 Compare Boolos (1984) for a philosophical argument.
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possible. For example, the class theory NBG has speed-up over ZF. Also, the second-order
arithmetic ACA0 has speed-up over PA.
The question of speed-up for axiomatic theories of truth is not only of interest because
it allows a fine-grained comparison of different theories, especially for conservative exten-
sions of Peano arithmetic. In addition to its attractiveness as a purely technical result, it is
philosophically well motivated and of particular relevance. In the philosophical debate
on truth, one of the questions concerns the function and utility of the truth predicate.
Deflationism is sometimes associated with the turn from asking what the nature of truth
is to the question what the function of the truth predicate is.5 The answer deflationism
gives is that the only function the truth predicate has is an expressive function.6 Although
this might sound very attractive at first sight it is not at all clear what ‘expressive function’
exactly means, and in my opinion this is one of the blind spots in the debate on deflationism.
Often in the debate the expressive function is illustrated by claiming that the truth predicate
allows for generalizations.7 Although generalizations are part of the story, there is no clear
criterion available at the moment for expressiveness. We think that speed-up can play a
role in explicating the utility and expressive function of the truth predicate. Simplification
of proofs is connected to the expressive function of the truth predicate. We will see in the
proof of our speed-up result that the main reason for a shortening of proofs is the provability
of a generalization that we cannot prove in the base theory. In the more interesting case,
that is, in the case of a conservative extension, the relevant generalization cannot even be
formulated in the language of the base theory. We need the extra expressive resources of
the truth predicate. This connection suggests a clear sufficient criterion for the increase
of expressive power, namely significant speed-up of a theory of truth over its base theory.
However we do not want to claim that speed-up exhausts the expressive function of the
truth predicate.
The claim that the truth predicate has an expressive function is not the main point that
separates deflationism from other conceptions of truth. Although deflationism emphasizes
the expressive function, most other conceptions are well compatible with it. The aspect
that sets deflationist theories apart is the conception that one should not inflate the notion
of truth. This conception is already implicit in the claim that the expressive function is the
only function of the truth predicate. Sometimes this is expressed by saying that deflationist
truth is not substantial.8 The notion of nonsubstantiality itself does not clarify much, but a
clear criterion has been suggested by Horsten (1995), Shapiro (1998), and Ketland (1999):
Only conservative extensions of the base theory are acceptable for a deflationist. We do not
want to contribute to the ongoing debate whether deflationist theories are committed to
conservative extensions or not, but just mention that for those who accept the criterion
it can be an additional philosophical motivation to investigate theories of truth that are
conservative extensions of Peano arithmetic.
5 See, for example, Horsten (2011).
6 Horwich, for example, writes:
The minimalist picture of truth has three principal components: first, an account
of the utility of truth (namely, to enable the explicit formulation of schematic
generalizations); ... (Horwich, 1998, p. 145)
7 Quine (1970) was the first to emphasize this role of the truth predicate.
8 Compare Horsten (2011, p. 79).
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In order to evaluate relevant theories of truth, we will restrict ourselves to axiomatic
theories of truth formulated in the language LT, which is an expansion of the arithmetical
languageLA by a one-place truth predicate T(x). Moreover, we consider only extensions of
Peano arithmetic, PA. The connection of simplification of proofs and increase of expressive
power gives us a philosophical motivation for the main question we want to address in this
paper: Does a theory of truth T extending PA have significant speed-up over PA with
respect to PA theorems?
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we introduce the basic notions
in order to give an adequate definition of speed-up. In the third section, we show that for
disquotational theories of truth the answer to our main question is negative. In the fourth
section, we will introduce the basic concepts that will be necessary to characterize the
features of a theory of truth for which the answer to our main question will be positive. Such
a theory will then be presented in the fifth section. A compositional theory of positive truth,
PT−, is chosen as an example for significant speed-up. This is followed by a discussion
of the case of classical compositional truth in the sixth section. In the last section, we will
discuss the consequences of these results for a deflationist account of truth.
§2. Basics. The question of speed-up depends on several choices. One choice is the
underlying calculus that is used. Another choice is which measure is applied. A third choice
depends on what counts as a significant speed-up.
We are going to use a schematic Hilbert style axiomatic system based on the rules of
modus ponens and generalization.9 There are two measures of the length of a proof: the
symbol-length and the step-length. For a proof in a Hilbert style calculus d, the symbol-
length of d is the total number of occurrences of symbols in d and the step-length of d is the
total number of occurrences of formulas in d. In the following we will restrict ourselves to
the symbol-length for several reasons. First of all, counting all the symbols is more truthful
to the task. Every last small difference in the formulation gets counted, whereas in the
case of step-length very long formulas can be used in a single step. Moreover, some of
the speed-up results are established only for the case of symbol-length and it is not known
whether those results can be transferred to the case of step-length. To be more precise we
will use the notion of size of a proof that corresponds to the symbol-length.
We consider a standard encoding of formulas and proofs as sequences in a finite
alphabet.
DEFINITION 2.1. The size of a formula ϕ is the length of the sequence coding ϕ and will
be denoted by |ϕ|. The size of a proof d is the length of the code for d and will be denoted
by |d|.
We also write d : A  ϕ for d is a proof of ϕ from A in our Hilbert-style calculus, where
A is a set of axioms of a theory. And A  ϕ for ϕ is derivable in A, and A n ϕ for: there
is a proof of ϕ in A of size ≤ n. Moreover we use
||ϕ||A =
{
minimal n such that A n ϕ, if A  ϕ
∞ otherwise
It is also convenient to use the big-O or Landau notation from complexity theory.
9 For a presentation of such a system, consult Pudlák (1998, p. 552f ).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020314000070
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 26 Nov 2018 at 14:09:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
322 MARTIN FISCHER
DEFINITION 2.2. Let f, g be functions: N → N, then
f (x) = O(g(x)) iff there is a x0 and k, such that for all x > x0, f (x) ≤ k · g(x).
What does it mean for a speed-up to be significant? Two important classes of functions are
the polynomial and the (Kalmar) elementary functions. In the case of a difference that is
only polynomial, we are reluctant to say that it is significant. In complexity theory, it is
very common to neglect differences of polynomial size.10
The class of functions with Kalmar elementary growth rate contains the polynomial
functions. A natural suggestion for a sufficient criterion for significant increase is the
first function that majorizes all the Kalmar elementary functions. The superexponential
function is the first function in the Wainer-hierarchy that majorizes all Kalmar elementary
functions. The general formulation is 2nm defined by recursion as follows: 2
n
0 = n and
2nm+1 = 22
n
m . We often use the special case 20m and just use the abbreviation 2m in this case.
We can then characterize the Kalmar elementary functions as follows: a function f has
Kalmar elementary growth rate if there is a natural number m, such that f (x) is eventually
majorized by 2xm . This allows for a precise definition of nonelementary speed-up:
11
DEFINITION 2.3 (Speed-up). Let T, T ′ be two recursive sets of axioms and T and T ′ the
corresponding sets of theorems, such that the signature of T is a subset of the signature of
T ′ and T ⊆ T ′. Let  ⊆ T .
(i). T ′ has at most polynomial speed-up over T if there exists a polynomial P with
natural coefficients, such that for all ϕ with T  ϕ, then
||ϕ||T < P(||ϕ||T ′).
(ii). T ′ has nonelementary speed-up over T with respect to  if there is a sequence of
formulas {ϕi }i∈ω ⊆  such that there is no function f with Kalmar elementary
growth rate satisfying ||ϕi ||T < f (||ϕi ||T ′) for all i ∈ ω.
All the examples mentioned in the introduction are examples of nonelementary speed-up.
§3. Disquotational truth. In this section, we investigate the length of proofs for dis-
quotational theories of truth, that is, theories that take the T-sentences as truth theoretic
axioms. The arithmetical language LA contains (0, S, +, ×, =) and LT is LA expanded by
a one-place predicate T. In order to state the theory we follow some notational conventions:
We assume some appropriate fixed standard Gödel-numbering. If e is an LA-expression,
then we will use #e to refer to the Gödelnumber of e, whereas e is the canonical term, that
is, the numeral, representing the Gödelnumber of e in LA. The usual definition of numerals
n as S...S(0) is not suitable for our purposes. For a number n given in binary presentation,
that is n = ∑ki=0 2i ai , ai ∈ {0, 1}, we take n = a0 +2·( a1 +2·( a2 +...( ak−1 +2·ak)...)),
where 1 = S(0) and 2 = 1 + 1. This gives us that |n| is O(log n).12 We also assume
that our language contains function symbols for some primitive recursive functions. For
example, the NUM function that sends a number n to the Gödelnumber of its numeral that
is #n is represented by num. In some cases, we also write a dot ˙ above its argument to
10 Compare Caldon & Ignjatović (2005, p. 6).
11 Compare, for example, Caldon & Ignjatović (2005).
12 See also Pudlák (1998, p. 580).
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represent the NUM function, so ẋ is the same as num(x). We also have the p.r. substitution
function SUB(n, m, k) which is #ϕ(t/v), that is, the Gödelnumber of a formula in which
all occurrences of the variable v have been replaced by the term t , in the case that n = #ϕ,
m = #v , k = #t . We will use sub as a representation of this substitution function. In the
case that ϕ(v1, . . . , vn) is a formula with at most the displayed variables occurring free
in it, then we will use ϕ(ẋ1, . . . , ẋn) as shorthand for sub(. . . sub(ϕ, v1, ẋ1) . . . ,
vn, ẋn).
We first consider the simplest case TB, which is PA extended by the T-sentences for
arithmetic, that is, for all sentences ϕ ∈ LA the instance of the following scheme:
(TBϕ) T(ϕ) ↔ ϕ.
We give an outline of a proof that TB has at most polynomial speed-up over PA. Pudlák
(1998) has proved all the requirements necessary to obtain a stronger result namely for
UTB, a stronger version of disquotationalism. UTB is PA extended by instances of
induction for all formulas of LT and all uniform T-sentences for arithmetic, that is, for
all formulas ϕ(x1, . . . , xk) ∈ LA the instance of the following scheme:
(UTBϕ) ∀x1...∀xk (T(ϕ(ẋ1, . . . , ẋk)) ↔ ϕ(x1, . . . , xk)).
Both theories, TB and UTB, are conservative extensions of PA.
One way to prove the conservativity of TB over PA is to give a constructive method of
how to transform a proof of an arithmetical formula ϕ in TB into a proof of ϕ in PA. The
basic idea is to replace the truth predicate in the proof by an arithmetically definable partial
truth predicate. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn be an enumeration of finitely many different sentences of
LA, that is ϕi = ϕ j for all i = j with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Then we can define a partial truth
predicate Tn for these formulas in LA, such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, PA  Tn(ϕi) ↔ ϕi .
Take
Tn(x) := (x = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ1) ∨ ... ∨ (x = ϕn ∧ ϕn).
This transformation gives a local interpretation of TB in PA as only finitely many in-
stances of TBϕ are used in a proof. To get the desired result on the length of proofs, we
have to give a version of this local interpretation that does not increase the size of proofs
too much.
For an adequate estimate on the length of proofs we will follow Pudlák’s presentation
in Pudlák (1998). We will use a theorem by Pudlák that shows that it is possible to define
partial truth predicates in a polynomial way. For a set  of arithmetical formulas with
restricted complexity we can define a truth predicate T. There are different ways to restrict
the complexity of the formulas. We are going to assume an upper bound n on the depth of
the formulas in .
THEOREM 3.1 (Pudlák).13 There is a sequence of formulas Satn(x, y) of polynomial size
(in n) definable in LA, such that for every ϕ(y1, . . . , yk) with depth ≤ n, the theory PA
proves
Satn(ϕ, x) ↔ ϕ((x)1, . . . , (x)k).
using a proof of polynomial size (in n).
As a consequence we get the following for a theory of universal Tarski biconditionals for-
mulated with a satisfaction predicate. Let UTBsat be the theory formulated in the language
13 For a proof see Pudlák (1998, p. 560f, Theorem 3.3.1, p. 562).
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of Lsat, which is LA expanded by a two place predicate Sat. The theory UTBsat contains
PA, all instances of the induction scheme for the language Lsat and for all formulas
ϕ(y1, . . . , yk)
(UTBsatϕ ) ∀x (Sat(ϕ, x) ↔ ϕ((x)1, . . . , (x)k)).
THEOREM 3.2. UTBsat has at most polynomial speed-up over PA.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1 there are polynomials P1, P2 such that for all n, |Satn| < P1(n)
and for all ϕ with depth less or equal to n, there is a proof d : PA  Satn(ϕ, y) ↔
ϕ((y)1, . . . , (y)k) with |d| < P2(n).
Let e : UTBsat n ϕ with ϕ ∈ LA. We will transform e into a proof e′ in PA. In the first
step we replace every occurrence of Sat in e by Satn . This will be sufficient, as the depth of
all formulas ψ used in e is smaller than n. The result e∗ is a sequence of formulas ofLA and
since the formula Satn is polynomial e∗ we can give an upper bound of |e∗| < n · P1(n).
But e∗ is not a proof. Induction axioms used in e containing the satisfaction predicate are
turned into arithmetical induction axioms. But instances of UTBsatϕ are not translated into
axioms, but into PA-provable formulas. To turn e∗ into a proof e′ we have to replace every
translation of an instance ψ of UTBsatϕ by a proof eψ of this translation. But we know
that there are such proofs eψ , such that |eψ | < P2(n). And since n is greater than the
number of instances of UTBsatϕ used in e we can give an upper bound: |e′| ≤ n · P2(|e∗|) ≤
n · P2(n · P1(n)), which is polynomial in n. 
The theory UTBsat is a more general version of UTB. It is easy to define a truth predicate
from a satisfaction predicate, that is, we can give a definitional extension of UTBsat that
contains UTB. The definitional extension clearly preserves the arithmetical vocabulary
from which we can infer that also UTB and TB have at most polynomial speed-up over PA.
Regarding disquotational theories of truth we have to draw the following conclusion.
Typed disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories that contain only T-biconditionals
for arithmetical sentences, have no significant speed-up over PA, and in this respect the
introduction of a disquotational truth predicate does not increase our expressive ressources.
This does not answer the question for type-free disquotational theories of truth, that is, dis-
quotational theories that allow also T-biconditionals for sentences containing the truth
predicate, such as PUTB. We will see in the next section that for type-free disquotational
theories that prove the consistency of PA we get nonelementary speed-up by a very general
result. However, a more interesting question is whether there are ‘natural’ conservative
type-free disquotational theories that simplify proofs in a nontrivial way.14 We will not
pursue this question here but leave it for future research.
§4. Nonelementary speed-up. In contrast to the disquotational theories of truth there
are typed compositional theories of truth that have nonelementary speed-up over PA.
Before we give some examples, we introduce the relevant concepts used in the proofs. The
results of this section are known and are repeated here for expository purposes. The method
of proof we are going to use relies heavily on a method developed by Solovay. Solovay’s
original proof was not published and therefore we will mainly follow the Pudlák (1998)
presentation. Moreover, we try to indicate the persons who proved the theorems first. Even
14 The restriction ‘natural’ is supposed to exclude artificial type-free disquotational theories, for
example those construed with McGee’s trick. Compare McGee (1992).
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755020314000070
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UB der LMU München, on 26 Nov 2018 at 14:09:59, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
TRUTH AND SPEED-UP 325
if we are not able do this for all of them, at least we do not claim any originality of results
in this section.
For a theory T to have nonelementary speed-up over PA, it is sufficient that there is a
sequence of formulas ϕ0, ϕ1, . . . , provable in PA, for which the following two claims hold:
• there is no function f with Kalmar elementary growth rate, such that for all n,
||ϕn||PA = f (n);
• there is a polynomial function g, such that for all n, ||ϕn||T = g(n).
The first claim is a lower bound on proofs of those ϕi in PA and the second is an upper
bound on proofs of the ϕi in T . The formulas used to establish the speed-up result are
partial consistency statements. A theorem by Friedman and Pudlák shows that there are no
short proofs for those partial consistency statements in PA. This allows for the possibility
of partial consistency statements for which there is no function with Kalmar elementary
growth rate, which is a bound on the length of proofs of those statements in PA. Those
partial consistency statements will be used to prove the first claim.
To prove the second claim, one has to show that there are short proofs of those partial
consistency statements in a specific theory T , that is, the length of proofs can be bound
by a polynomial. This can either be established by a consistency proof for PA in T or
more interestingly, for conservative theories, it is sometimes possible to define a cut and
prove the consistency of PA on this cut. In this section we are going to repeat basic results
concerning partial consistency statements and definable cuts.
Let Prpa(n, ϕ) be a polynomial representation of ||ϕ||PA ≤ n, such that whenever it
is true that ||ϕ||PA ≤ n, then Prpa(n, ϕ) has a proof of polynomial length in n in Q.15
Let Conpa(n) be the statement of consistency of PA up to length ≤ n, that is
Conpa(x) := ¬Prpa(x, 0 = 1)
These partial consistency statements are all b1.
THEOREM 4.1 (Friedman/Pudlák).16 Let T be a sufficiently strong fragment of arithmetic,
axiomatized by an NP set of axioms. Then there exists an ε > 0, such that for all n,
||ConT (n)||T > nε.
In order to connect this with the superexponentiation function we use the following
theorem.17
THEOREM 4.2. Let T be a sufficiently strong theory. Let f be a provably total function in
T whose graph has a polynomial numeration in T . Then there exists an ε > 0 such that
||ConT ( f (n))||T ≥ f (n)ε,
while
||ConT ( f (n))||T +ConT = O(log n).
In the case that T is strong enough to formalize the following lemma then the restriction to
functions whose graph has a polynomial numeration is not essential:18
15 See Pudlák (1998, p. 580).
16 Pudlák (1998, p. 581, Theorem 6.2.3) or Buss (1994, p. 741, Theorem 4).
17 See Pudlák (1998, p. 588).
18 See Pudlák (1998, p. 587).
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LEMMA 4.3. For any recursive function f , there exists a recursive function g such that
• ∀n ∈ N f (n) ≤ g(n),
• the graph of g is a polynomial time computable function.
Important for our purposes is the following corollary:
COROLLARY 4.4. ||Conpa(2n)||PA ≥ (2n)ε , for some constant ε > 0.
The full consistency statement can be understood as a generalization of all the partial
consistency statements and we can easily derive all the partial consistency statements from
it in a direct and short manner. This gives us the following corollary:19
COROLLARY 4.5. PA + Conpa has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
This corollary shows that for all axiomatic theories of truth that contain PA and prove the
consistency of PA we have nonelementary speed-up. Since all theories of truth that prove
the consistency of PA are on a par with regard to speed-up, we have a reason to focus
on conservative theories of truth as in this case the question is not already answered by
this corollary. Also from another perspective we have a reason to focus on conservative
extensions. The consistency statement for PA is a generalization that we can state in LA.
In this case we cannot fully separate the deductive and expressive power of truth. Here
the reason for speed-up relies on the ability to prove a generalization, that is expressible
without the truth predicate. In contrast, conservative theories of truth can only prove gener-
alizations, which are either also provable in PA or which we cannot formulate without the
truth predicate. It is the second form of generalizations that we are interested in, because
these are the generalizations that are signs of increase of expressive power. One of those
generalizations will allow us to derive all the partial consistency statements in a short
manner.
In order to formulate such a generalization, the notion of a cut is helpful. In the model
theory of PA, cuts are initial segments of a nonstandard model, that is, sets that contain
0 are closed under the successor function S and if n is in the set then also all m that are
considered by the model to be smaller than n are in the set. The natural numbers are a cut in
this sense in any nonstandard model of PA. A definable cut is a formula that defines in any
model an initial segment. In the following we will only talk about definable cuts.20 They
play an important role in the study of speed-up and will be used frequently later on. In the
following we assume that T ⊇ Q is a sequential theory, that is, a theory that is capable
of coding finite sequences, in a language expansion of LA.
A formula I(x) is called inductive in T iff the following statements are provable:
(i). T  I(0).
(ii). T  ∀x (I(x) → I(Sx)).
A formula C(x) is a cut in T iff it is inductive and
(iii). T  ∀x∀y (C(x) ∧ y < x → C(y)).
A cut C(x) is called proper if T  ∀x C(x).
19 Stronger results are known. Basically if T is a sufficiently strong theory of arithmetic that proves
Conpa, then T has speed-up by any provably total recursive function of T . Compare Buss (1994).
20 The material on cuts presented in this paper is well known. The method of shortening cuts was
developed by Solovay (unpublished). For more on cuts, see for example Hájek & Pudlák (1993).
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We clearly have that for all cuts C(x) in T and all n ∈ Nwe have T  C(n). Cuts already
have some nice properties; however, there are ways to get cuts with more interesting
properties. Solovay developed a powerful method of shortening cuts. The first thing to
notice is that every inductive formula gives rise to a cut. Inductive formulas may be satisfied
by two numbers n, m and not by k with n < k < m. However, there is an initial segment
in which all elements satisfy the original inductive formula and we can define this initial
segment by shortening.
LEMMA 4.6. Let I(x) be an inductive formula in T . Then there is a cut CI(x) in T , such
that T  ∀x (C(x) → I(x)).
Proof. The idea of the proof is to restrict the inductive formula I(x). So let
C(x) :↔ ∀y (y ≤ x → I(y)).
Then it is straightforward to check that C(x) is a cut and C(x) → I(x).21 
Moreover, every cut can be shortened to a cut that is closed under addition and multiplica-
tion.
LEMMA 4.7. Let C(x) be a cut in T . Then there is a formula C+(x) such that
(i). C+(x) is a cut in T ;
(ii). T  ∀x (C+(x) → C(x));
(iii). T  ∀x∀y (C+(x) ∧ C+(y) → C+(x + y)).
Proof. For C(x) a cut in T we can define C+(x) := ∀z (C(z) → C(z + x)).
C+(0) we get directly. C+(x) → C+(Sx) by the fact that T  S(z + x) = z + Sx .
So C+ is inductive in T . Since C is a cut C+ is also a cut. It is straightforward to check
that (ii) is satisfied. (iii) Holds because of the associativity of addition. 
With a similar construction we get a cut that is closed under addition and multiplication.
LEMMA 4.8. Let C+(x) be a cut in T closed under addition. Then there is a formula
C×(x) such that
(i). C×(x) is a cut in T ;
(ii). T  ∀x (C×(x) → C+(x));
(iii). T  ∀x∀y (C×(x) ∧ C×(y) → C×(x × y)).
(iv). T  ∀x∀y (C×(x) ∧ C×(y) → C×(x + y)).
Proof. Take C×(x) :↔ ∀z (C+(z) → C+(z × x)). That C×(x) is a cut is proved
similar to the previous proof. (ii) is also checked directly. For (iii) we rely on the fact that
we can prove the associativity of multiplication in T . For (iv) C×(x) → ∀z (C+(z) →
C+(z × x)) and C×(y) → ∀z (C+(z) → C+(z × y)). Since C+ is closed under addition
C×(x) ∧ C×(y) → ∀z (C+(z) → C+(z × x + z × y)) and therefore C×(x) ∧ C×(y) →
∀z (C+(z) → C+(z × (x + y)). 
21 This works for theories for which we can prove the transitivity of <, but not in the case of Q.
In this case we have to restrict ourselves to a transitively closed inductive formula. In this case
let ψ<(x) be the formula ∀y∀z (z < y ∧ y < x → z < x). It is easy to check that ψ<(x) is
inductive. Further we know that the conjunction of two inductive formulas is again an inductive
formula. So let I<(x) := I(x) ∧ ψ<(x) and C(x) := ∀y (y ≤ x → I<(y)).
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What we do not get in general is a cut that is closed under exponentiation. This method
of shortening cuts doesn’t work for the reason that exponentiation is not associative.22
However, for every cut C(x) in S we can define a new cut C∗(x) :↔ C(2x ) such that
S  ∀x (C∗(x) → C(x)∧ C(2x )). This construction can be iterated. Moreover, this can be
achieved in a schematic way such that the proofs are polynomial in n.23 In the following
let Cut(ϕ) be short for the claim that ϕ is a cut formula, that is ϕ(0) ∧ ∀x (ϕ(x) →
ϕ(Sx)) ∧ ∀x∀y (C(x) ∧ y < x → C(y)).
THEOREM 4.9. Let T be a theory containing a sufficiently strong fragment of arithmetic.
Let ϕ0(x) be a cut in T . Then there is a sequence of formulas ϕ1, ϕ2, ... such that for each
n the following formula
Cut(ϕn+1(x)) ∧ ∀x (ϕn+1(x) → (ϕn(x) ∧ ϕn(2x )))
has a proof in T of size polynomial in n.
Combining the proofs for ϕn(0) → ϕn−1(20), ϕn−1(20) → ϕn−2(220), . . . , ϕ1(2n−1) →
ϕ0(2n) we get a proof of ϕ0(2n) that is polynomial in n.
COROLLARY 4.10. Let T be a theory containing a sufficiently strong fragment of arith-
metic. Let C(x) be a cut in T . Then ||C(2n)||T = nO(1).
Cuts are themselves very interesting and have important consequences. For example Pudlák
uses the method of cuts to give a strengthening of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem
that says that no consistent theory containing Q proves its consistency on a cut.24 Cuts are
also used to show the interpretability of some bounded arithmetics in Q.25
Combining the facts about partial consistency statements and cuts gives a way to prove
speed-up results for theories that prove the consistency of PA on a cut.
THEOREM 4.11. Let T be a theory that proves the consistency of PA on a cut, that is, there
is a formula C(x) in LT such that C(x) is a cut in T and T  ∀x (C(x) → Conpa(x)).
Then ||Conpa(2n)||T = nO(1).
Proof. Let C(x) be a cut in T such that T  ∀x (C(x) → Conpa(x)). By Corol-
lary 4.10, we have ||C(2n)||T = nO(1). Combining these proofs, suffices to show that
||Conpa(2n)||T = nO(1). 
Combining Corollary 4.4 and Theorem 4.11 we get a sufficient criterion for speed-up:
THEOREM 4.12. Let T be a theory that proves the consistency of PA on a cut. Then T has
nonelementary speed-up over PA.
In contrast to the statement Conpa, which is a sentence of LA, a statement of consistency
on a cut ∀x (C(x) → Conpa(x)) does not imply nonconservativity. The reason being that
the restriction to a cut C may contain new vocabulary.
22 Compare Burgess (2005, p. 103f) for an elaboration of this point. Paris & Dimitracopoulos (1983)
show the impossibility.
23 For a proof see Pudlák (1998, p. 563).
24 See Pudlák (1985).
25 Compare Hájek & Pudlák (1993, p. 366f).
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This proof method has been used by Solovay to establish speed-up results for ACA0
over PA as well as GB over ZF. So for example ACA0 proves the consistency of PA on a
cut, which allows one to prove that ACA0 has superexponential speed-up over PA.
§5. Positive compositional truth. We are now ready for a first application to com-
positional theories of truth. In the next subsection we are going to show that the theory
of truth PT− has nonelementary speed-up over PA. In order to state the theory we follow
some conventions:
The set of Gödelnumbers of arithmetical sentences is represented by Snt, the set of
arithmetical formulas by Fml, the set of all formulas with at most one free variable by
Fml1. #FV(x) stands for the number of free variables of the formula x . The set of closed
terms is represented by Ct. Moreover, we will use the letters s, t with the intended reading
of variables that range over closed terms, that is ∀t ϕ(t) is an abbreviation for ∀x (Ct(x) →
ϕ(x)). We represent the p-time function that applied to a closed term gives the value of that
term by val. The function that takes the Gödelnumber of a formula to the Gödelnumber
of its universal closure of it, is represented by ucl. For the representation of syntactical
operations we use the dot notation, for example x ∧. y represents the concatenation of x and
the conjunction symbol and y. In the case that x is a formula with one free variable v we just
use x(t) short for sub(x, v, t). We will also use the vector notation t to refer to sequences
of closed terms. So ∀t ϕ(t ) is short for ∀x (Seq(x) ∧ ∀i ≤ lh(x) Ct((x)i ) → ϕ(x)).
Moreover we assume some enumeration of the free variables vi in a formula, such that for
a formula x with n free variables and t a sequence of terms of length greater or equal to n,
x(t ) is short for x((t)1/v1, . . . (t)n/vn).
PT− is then given by the universal closures of the following axioms:
(C1) T(s =. t) ↔ val(s) = val(t).
(C2) T( ¬. (s =. t)) ↔ ¬ val(s) = val(t).
(C3) Snt(x ∧. y) → (T(x ∧. y) ↔ T(x) ∧ T(y)).
(C4) Snt( ¬. (x ∧. y)) → (T( ¬. (x ∧. y)) ↔ T(¬. x) ∨ T( ¬. y)).
(C5) Snt(x ∨. y) → (T(x ∨. y) ↔ T(x) ∨ T(y)).
(C6) Snt( ¬. (x ∨. y)) → (T( ¬. (x ∨. y)) ↔ T( ¬. x) ∧ T( ¬. y)).
(C7) Snt( ∀. y x) → (T( ∀. y x) ↔ ∀t T(x(t))).
(C8) Snt( ¬. ∀. y x) → (T( ¬. ∀. y x) ↔ ∃t T( ¬. x(t))).
(C9) Snt( ∃. y x) → (T( ∃. y x) ↔ ∃t (T(x(t))).
(C10) Snt( ¬. ∃. y x) → (T( ¬. ∃. y x) ↔ ∀t T( ¬. x(t))).
(C11) Snt(x) → (T( ¬. ¬. x) ↔ T(x)).
(C12) Fml1(x) → (T(x(t)) ↔ T(x(num(val(t)))).
Formulas for which every substitution instance by a closed term is either true or its negation
is true are called total:
tot(x) :⇔ Fml1(x) ∧ ∀t (T(x(t)) ∨ T( ¬. x(t))).
The induction axiom of PT− is a kind of internal induction, restricted to total formulas:
(ItI) tot(x) ∧ T(x(0)) ∧ ∀u (T(x(u̇)) → T(x(num(Su)))) → ∀u T(x(u̇)).
PT− := PA ∪ (C1)-(C12) ∪ (ItI).
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It is well known that PT− proves all instances of the uniform T-biconditionals, that is
PT−  ∀t (T(ϕ(t/x)) ↔ ϕ(val(t))) , for all formulas ϕ(x) ∈ LA.
The axiom (C12) guarantees that the truth value of a sentence ϕ(t), that is, the result from
replacing the only free variable in ϕ by the closed term t , only depends on the value of t .26
It allows us to prove the principle of regularity.
LEMMA 5.1. PT−  ∀x∀s∀t (Fml1(x) ∧ val(s) = val(t) → (Tx(s) ↔ Tx(t))).
We can define the positive grade PG of a formula by saying that literals have the positive
grade 0 and if ϕ is of the form ¬¬ ψ , ψ ∧ χ , ψ ∨ χ , ¬ (ψ ∧ χ), ¬ (ψ ∨ χ), then PG(ϕ) =
max{PG(ψ), PG(χ)}+1 and if ϕ is of the form ∀x ψ , ∃x ψ , ¬∀x ψ , ¬∃x ψ , then PG(ϕ) =
PG(ψ) + 1. We use pg for the representation of PG.
In the following we are going to show that PT− has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
We will do this by showing that PT− proves the consistency of PA on a cut. So our first
step will be the definition of our cut in PT−. The cut has some nice properties that will
allow us to prove the consistency of PA on this cut in the following way: first, notice that
PT− proves that logic is true on this cut, that is, it proves that all logical axioms on this cut
are true. Then we show that all arithmetical axioms are true on this cut. We can then show
that the rules of inference preserve truth on this cut.
We have to make sure that our formal representations ϕ(x) behave in the way expected.
Since in PT− we do not have full induction for all formulas containing the truth predicate,
we will sometimes not be able to show ∀x ϕ(x), although we can show that ϕ(0) and
∀x (ϕ(x) → ϕ(Sx)). In these cases we will restrict ourselves to an initial segment whose
members all satisfy ϕ.
In a first step we will restrict ourselves to universal quantifier blocks for which we can
still prove a generalization of (C7). The reason for this restriction is that our axiom (C7)
is only for the case of one universal quantifier, although we would like to have the general
form for an arbitrary number of universal quantifiers. We could introduce an axiom for
any fixed finite number of free variables. However later, we want to prove that all logical
axioms are true. For this we will use a representation lAx of the set of logical axioms.
By overspill there will be nonstandard formulas satisfying lAx, and there will be formulas
where the number of free variables is nonstandard. As we don’t have full induction we
cannot guarantee that a generalization of (C7) holds for all formulas. In this case we have
to restrict ourselves to those formulas for which the number of quantifiers is in a specific
cut.
LEMMA 5.2.
∀x (Fml(x) ∧ #FV(x) = z + 1 → (∀t (lh(t ) > z → Tx(t )) ↔ Tucl(x)))
is inductive.
Proof. Let Iu(z) be the formula in question. Iu(0) is proved by axiom (C7). For the
successor step we also use (C7). 
Let Cu(x) be a cut formula resulting from shortening the formula Iu(z).
In a second step we will restrict ourselves to universal quantifier blocks for which we
can still prove a generalization of regularity:
26 Compare Cantini (1989, p. 102).
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LEMMA 5.3.
∀x(Fml(x) ∧ #FV(x) = z + 1 → ∀s, t (lh(s ) > z ∧ lh(t ) > z ∧
∀i (1 ≤ i ≤ z + 1 → val((s)i ) = val((t)i )) → (Tx(s ) ↔ Tx(t ))))
is inductive.
Proof. Let Iv(z) be the formula in question. Iv(0) is proved by regularity. For the
successor step regularity is also used. 
Let Cv(x) be a cut formula resulting from shortening the inductive formula Iv(x). We take
Cr(x) := Cu(x) ∧ Cv(x).
By shortening we can assume that our cut is closed under addition and multiplication
and since our Gödelcoding makes no use of exponentiation we have
PT−  ∀x (Cr(x) ∧ Ct(x) → ∃y (Cr(y) ∧ val(x) = y)).
Next we define total and complete formulas with a restricted number of free variables:
tcCr (x) := Fml(x)∧Cr(#FV(x))∧∀t (lh(t ) ≥ #FV(x) → (¬Tx(t ) ↔ T ¬. x(t ))) We can
use this restriction on the number of free variables to define a new inductive formula It(x):
It(x) := ∀y (Fml(y) ∧ pg(y) = x ∧ Cr(#FV(y)) → tcCr(y)).
LEMMA 5.4. It(x) is inductive in PT
−.
Proof. The case It(0): the provably unique readability of LA-formulas guarantees that
we can prove in PA that
∀x (Fml(x) ∧ pg(x) = 0 → ∃y, z (Term(y) ∧ Term(z) ∧ (x = y =. z ∨ x = y =. z)))
Moreover we can prove in PA
∀y, z, t (Term(y) ∧ Term(z) ∧ lh(t ) ≥ #FV(y =. x) →
(val(y(t )) = val(z(t )) ∨ val(y(t )) = val(z(t )))).
With the axioms (C1) and (C2) we can then prove in PT− that
∀y, z, t (Term(y) ∧ Term(z) ∧ lh(t ) ≥ #FV(y =. x) →
(T( ¬. y =. x(t )) ↔ ¬T(y =. x(t ))∧
T( ¬. y =. x(t )) ↔ ¬T(y =. x(t )))).
The case ∀x (It(x) → It( S. x)): by the positive truth clause of PT−. The provable unique
readability guarantees that formulas of positive grade n + 1 are built up by one of the cases
taken care of by (C3) − (C11). Those axioms ensure that truth determinateness, that is
being tc, is preserved by the positive build up of formulas. 
Since the positive grade of a formula is less or equal to its code we get by the method of
shortening a cut Ct(x) that contains only truth determinate formulas.
LEMMA 5.5. There is a cut Ct(x) in PT
−, such that
PT−  ∀x (Fml(x) ∧ Ct(x) → Cr(#FV(x)) ∧ tcCr(x)).
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We can use this cut to prove that the universal closures of logical axiom instances are true
on the cut. Let lAx be a formula strongly representing the primitive recursive set of being
a logical axiom in the language LA.27
LEMMA 5.6. PT−  ∀x (Ct(x) ∧ lAx(x) → Tucl(x)).
Proof. For the propositional axioms this is done in the usual way by considering one
instance of the axiom schema containing the truth predicate and using the fact that the
logical axiom is total and complete. For example consider the axiom schema
A → (A ∨ B).
We need to prove that
∀x (Ct(x) ∧ ∃y, z (Fml(y) ∧ Fml(z) ∧ x = y →. (y ∨. z) → Tucl(x))).
We have
Ty(t ) → (Ty(t ) ∨ Tz(t ))
as an instance of the logical axiom schema itself containing the truth predicate. By our
assumption x, y, z are total and complete and we get
T(y →. (y ∨. z))(t ).
By the assumption that the number of free variables is in the cut we can infer by Lemma
5.2 that
Tucl(y →. (y ∨. z)).
Similar for the quantifier axioms by using regularity and the generalized version of
(C7). 
Moreover, due to the fact that UTB ⊆ PT−, we can prove in PT− that all axioms of Q
are true. What we need to prove is that all induction axioms of PA are true on this cut. Let
IndAxpa(x) be an arithmetical formula strongly representing the recursive set of being an
induction axiom of PA.
LEMMA 5.7. PT−  ∀x (Ct(x) ∧ IndAxpa(x) → T(x)).
Proof. Since IndAxpa(x) is a representation of the induction axioms we have that
PT− proves:
(+) ∀x (IndAxpa(x) → ∃y (Fml1(y) ∧ x = [y(0) ∧. ∀. z (y(ż) →. y( S. ż)) →. ∀. z y(ż)])).
We argue in PT−. Assuming that Ct(x) ∧ IndAxpa(x) we get that
∃y (Fml1(y) ∧ x = [y(0) ∧. ∀. z (y(z) →. y( S. ż)) →. ∀. z y(z)]).
Moreover, by pg(y) ≤ pg(x) and Ct(x) we get tc(y). But then by ItI also
T(y(0)) ∧ ∀z (T(y(ż)) → T(y(num(Sz)))) → ∀z (T(y(ż))).
By tc(y) and regularity and the fact that PA  val(num(Sz)) = val( S. ż) we have
T(y(0)) ∧ ∀z (T(y(ż)) → T(y( S. ż))) → ∀z (T(y(ż))).
27 For a concrete version of a Hilbert style axiomatic calculus one can consider the system as
presented in Pudlák (1998, p. 552f ).
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By tc(y) we have full compositionality for y and get
PT−  T[y(0) ∧. ∀. z (y(ż) →. y( S. ż)) →. ∀. z y(ż)].
This suffices to get the desired result. 
It is easy to show that the truth for total formulas is closed under modus ponens.
LEMMA 5.8. PT−  ∀x∀y (Ct(x) ∧ Ct(y) ∧ Tucl(x) ∧ Tucl(x →. y) → Tucl(y)).
Also the rule of generalization restricted to the cut preserves truth.
LEMMA 5.9.
PT−  ∀x∀y (Ct(x) ∧ Ct(y) ∧ z /∈ FV(x) ∧ Tucl(x →. y) → Tucl(x →. ∀. z y(z))).
Those lemmata will be sufficient to prove a restricted reflection principle.28 Remember
that Prpa(x, y) stands for there is a proof of y in PA of length less or equal to x .
THEOREM 5.10. There is a cut C in PT− such that PT− proves
∀x∀y (C(x) ∧ C(y) ∧ Prpa(x, y) → Tucl(y)).
Proof. We will use the formula
I(n) := ∀y (Ct(y) ∧ Prpa(n + 1, y) → Tucl(y)).
First we will show that I(n) is inductive. I(0) is proved by Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7. For the
induction step we use Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9.
By shortening we get a cut CI(n) in PT
−, such that CI(n) → I(n) and since it is a cut
we get
CI(n) → ∀y (Ct(y) ∧ Prpa(n + 1, y) → Tucl(y)).
Then we get
∀x∀y (CI(x) ∧ Ct(y) ∧ Prpa(x, y) → Tucl(y)).
and by taking C(x) := CI(x) ∧ Ct(x) we have our desired result. 
COROLLARY 5.11. There is a cut C(x) in PT−, such that
PT−  ∀x (C(x) → Conpa(x)).
Proof. Consider 0 = 1. Clearly PT−  C(0 = 1) as it is a standard sentence. More-
over PT−  ¬T(0 = 1). By Theorem 5.10 we get ∀z (C(z) → ¬Prpa(z, 0 = 1)),
which is ∀x (C(x) → Conpa(x)) 
Then we can apply Theorem 4.12 to get
THEOREM 5.12. PT− has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
So far we have only considered typed theories of truth. Most type-free theories of truth
prove the consistency of PA such that we have nonelementary speed-up by Corollary 4.5.
However, there is a version of KF, which is conservative over PA. This is Cantini’s type-
free theory KFt.29 PT
− is basically a typed version of KFt. Since PT− ⊆ KFt the speed-up
result in Theorem 5.12 also holds for KFt.
28 The proof is an adapted version of Heck’s proof for Theorem 5.3. in Heck (2009).
29 Compare Cantini (1989).
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COROLLARY 5.13. KFt has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
It is an open question whether KFt has nonelementary speed-up over PT
− with respect to
LA formulas. This would be interesting as it would provide a comparison of the expres-
siveness of typed and type-free theories of truth as both theories are proof-theoretically
equivalent.
§6. Classical compositional truth. The case of classical compositional truth is a bit
more complicated, and as far as the author knows it is not resolved. However, there are
some partial answers due to observations by Albert Visser we want to mention. By classical
compositional truth we mean the system that we get from positive truth by adding a clause
for the commutation of negation and the truth predicate, that is, the universal closure of
(CC) Snt(x) → (T( ¬. x) ↔ ¬Tx).
We get at least two systems depending on the induction axioms.
CT := PA ∪ (C1)-(C12) ∪ (CC);
CT := PA ∪ (C1)-(C12) ∪ (CC) ∪ induction for LT-formulas.
There are more elegant axiomatizations of the system CT and its variants, but for our
modest purposes the axiomatization will be sufficient.30
The axiom (CC) marks the difference between positive and classical compositional
truth. (CC) itself is not a theorem of PT−; however, there is a cut such that PT− proves
(CC) restricted to this cut. A proof of this is implicit in the proof of Lemma 5.4.
It is well known that CT proves the global reflection principle for PA and therefore also
the consistency of PA.31
PROPOSITION 6.1. CT proves Conpa.
By applying Corollary 4.5 we see that
COROLLARY 6.2. CT has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
As far as the author knows the question whether CT has nonelementary speed-up is
open. What is known is that it is impossible to use the same method of cuts with the
consistency statements to show that there is nonelementary speed-up. The reason for this
is the interpretability of CT in PA.32
PROPOSITION 6.3. CT is relatively interpretable in PA.
Due to an observation by Albert Visser (unpublished), the interpretability implies that there
is no speed-up with regard to 01 formulas.
PROPOSITION 6.4 (Visser). CT has no nonelementary speed-up over PA for
01-formulas.
Proof. (Sketch) Let ψ be a 01-formula, that is ψ is of the form ∀x χ where χ is 0.
Let σ be an interpretation of CT in PA. Assume that CT n ψ . Then by the properties
30 Compare Halbach (2011, p. 65). The system PAFT, which is PA+ ‘there is a full truth class’ is a
variant of CT formulated in a relational language. Compare Enayat & Visser (2013).
31 For a proof see Halbach (2011, p. 104f ).
32 For a proof see Enayat & Visser (2013).
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of a relative interpretation there is a polynomial p such that PA p(n) σ (ψ), that is, for
δ(x) being the relativization of our translation PA p(n) ∀x (δ(x) → σ(χ)).
We have to prove that also PA p(n) ∀x χ for some polynomial p. We will basically
follow the proof strategy to show that an interpretation in PA preserves the 01 formulas.
33
LetM be a PA model. Then the interpretation σ allows us to define a modelMσ . Moreover
we can define an isomorphism f fromM to a modelM f , which is an initial segment of
Mσ . But Mσ | ψ and by downward persistence of 01 formulas M f | ψ and also
M | ψ . SinceM was an arbitrary PA model PA  ψ . We have to check that the relevant
steps can be formalized in such a way that we get a polynomial bound on the length of
proof.
The complexity of σ(χ) is restricted by some finite k ≤ p(n). Then by Theorem 3.1 we
get a partial satisfaction predicate Satk(x, y) in PA such that PA proves the uniform Tarski
biconditionals in a polynomial way. With this we get a polynomial p such that
PA p(n) ∀x (δ(x) → Satk(σχ, num(x))).
Let F be a p.r. function and f its representation defined such that F(#0) = #0σ and
F(#Sx) = #Sσ fx . Then PA p(n) δ(f(0)) and PA p(n) δ(f(x)) → δ(f(Sx)) by δ being
the relativization of our interpretation of PA in PA. And with full induction in PA we get
PA p(n) ∀x δ(f(x)) and therefore
PA p(n) ∀x Satk(σχ, num(f(x))).
Since f represents in a sense our isomorphism and χ being 0 we also have34
PA p(n) σχ(f(x)) ↔ χ(x)).
and with the T-biconditionals also
PA p(n) Satk(σχ, num(f(x))) → Satk(χ, num(x)).
This gives us
PA p(n) ∀x Satk(χ, num(x)).
and so we get our desired
PA p(n) ∀x χ(x). 
COROLLARY 6.5. CT does not prove the consistency of PA on a cut.
Another fact that is known about CT is an upper bound for speed-up.
PROPOSITION 6.6 (Leigh).35 CT attains at best superexponential speed-up.
Although for CT the usual strategy doesn’t work, there is a system for which it works.
By adding the statement ‘All axioms of PA are true.’ to the axioms of CT we get a theory
that is still a conservative extension of PA that has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
The proof of Proposition 6.1 contains at least two applications of induction for formulas
containing the truth predicate. The first is needed to prove that ‘All axioms of PA are
true’ and the second is needed to prove that for all n the result of a PA-proof of length
33 Compare Hájek & Pudlák (1993, p. 170f ).
34 Compare Hájek & Pudlák (1993, p. 171).
35 See for Leigh (2013, p. 17, Corollary 4).
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n is true. CT can do neither of these proof steps. So adding the statement ‘All axioms of
PA are true.’ to CT really makes a difference, although we still stay conservative over PA.
‘All axioms of PA are true’ is the statement ∀x (Snt(x)∧Axpa(x) → T(x)). So let CT∗ be
CT+∀x (Snt(x)∧Axpa(x) → T(x)). The method of Kotlarski et al. (1981) of extending
recursively saturated models can be used to show the following.
PROPOSITION 6.7. CT∗ is a conservative extension of PA.
On the other hand CT∗ is able to prove the consistency of PA on a cut.
PROPOSITION 6.8. CT∗ proves the consistency of PA on a cut.36
From this and Corollary 6.5 it follows that CT does not prove ‘All axioms of PA are true’
and by Theorem 4.12 we have:
COROLLARY 6.9. CT∗ has nonelementary speed-up over PA.
§7. Philosophical implications. Let us clarify the relevance of nonelementary speed-
up as a criterion for axiomatic theories truth in the light of the technical observations. For
theories of truth that are able to prove Conpa, nonelementary speed-up as a criterion is not
too distinctive, because all those theories will satisfy it. The case of axiomatic theories of
truth that are conservative extensions of PA is more interesting. One of the motivations for
considering conservative extensions might be a deflationist conception of truth. So even if
the technical results are interesting for primitivist accounts that are in favor of axiomatic
theories but assign no special role to the truth predicate, the criterion becomes especially
relevant for deflationist accounts. Deflationists claim that the utility of the truth predicate
consists in its expressive function and moreover that the expressive function is the only
function it has, it is so to say its raison d’être. Whereas the shortening of proofs is clearly
useful, the connection between speed-up and expressivity is not as obvious.
However if we look at nonconservative extensions we see that the reason for speed-up
is basically the possibility of proving the generalization ∀x Conpa(x) and with it the in-
stances Conpa(n) for arbitrarily large n by a proof polynomial in n. Here we see
the connection between speed-up and generalizations. Analysing the speed-up results
for conservative extensions shows that although we are not able to prove ∀x Conpa(x) with
an unrestricted universal quantifier, we can prove it for an universal quantifier restricted to
a cut, that is, we can prove a generalization, which in this case is restricted to a proper
definable cut. Not all the cuts definable by the truth predicate are proper and it is only
possible to have a proper definable cut if the induction is restricted to a proper part of the
language. As our base theory PA has induction for the language of arithmetic we need
a language expansion to enable a proper definable cut. The truth predicate allows us to
define this proper cut, which we were not able to define in the language of arithmetic.
The introduction of the truth predicate indicates therefore an increase of expressiveness
and this fits perfectly with the deflationist claims.
In general we therefore take nonelementary speed-up to be a positive feature of a theory
of truth, as it partly explains the utility of the truth predicate. So we should add it to our
preferred list of desiderata, such as for example the list of desiderata discussed in Leitgeb
(2007). Especially for deflationist theories it should be added as a relevant criterion.
36 Heck (2009) has a proof of generalization of this theorem in a draft for base theories containing
Q. He gives credit for the result to Visser.
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Accepting nonelementary speed-up as a criterion for deflationist theories allows us to
draw two conclusions. On the one hand our results indicate that KFt, PT
− and CT∗ are
promising candidates for deflationist theories of truth. On the other hand the lack of sig-
nificant speed-up is a sign of an inadequacy of the proposed axiomatization. Polynomial
speed-up is not significant and is not sufficient for a sign of increase of expressive power.
Our results in case of disquotational theories such as TB and UTB therefore point towards
an inadequacy of those theories regarding the expressive function of truth. This finding is
in line with common criticism of disquotationalism.37
In the remainder we want to address some possible objections. One might question the
relevance of the speed-up results because the theorems for which we get speed-up are not
‘natural’ arithmetical statements, but only syntactical consistency statements. However this
form of criticism is not compelling in the case of truth. Here the consistency statements
are especially important and intimately connected with the notion of truth. So the speed-up
of truth theories for consistency statements is particularly relevant.38 Moreover it is not
clear that the speed-up phenomenon is restricted to syntactical statements. In the cases
considered, the class of sentences for which we get speed-up contained partial consistency
statements. These are restricted forms of Conpa, a sentence that is independent from PA
and the independence plays a crucial role in Friedman and Pudlák’s proof that there are
no short proofs of the partial consistency statements in PA.39 It seems possible that there
are other independent arithmetical statements, which maybe more ‘natural’ and allow for
partial versions, such that we also get speed-up results for the class of those arithmetical
statements.
Another line of criticism might question the robustness of the results. In this paper, the
speed-up phenomenon is only investigated with respect to the base theory PA. One question
is whether we get similar results for other base theories. We think that this is a question that
needs addressing, but at the moment we can only conjecture that the speed-up results also
hold for set theoretic base theories that are reflexive. In the case of weaker base theories
with restricted induction like In we think that the proofs are not directly transferable.
One reason is that without the reflexivity of the base theory not all the partial consistency
statements will be provable in the base theory. Another reason is more specific to theories
of truth with the induction axiom ItI, as for example PT
−. For PT− it makes no difference
if we start with PA as base theory or In, we always get all induction axioms for the
arithmetical language.40 So because of the reflexivity of PA we will be able to prove the
consistency of the base theory and therefore our theory of truth will not be conservative
over the base theory. This observation seems to support the claim that in the case of truth
theories, PA is a natural base theory. Base theories with restricted forms of induction such
as In might appear artificial in the context of truth theories, because the truth predicate
ignores the quantifier complexities of arithmetical sentences in the sense that independent
of the complexity of an arithmetical sentence ϕ, the provably equivalent sentence T(ϕ)
is atomic. The complexity of the arithmetical sentence is so to say hidden in the term
37 Compare Gupta (1993) and Halbach (1999, 2011, chap. 7).
38 Thanks to Sean Walsh for the helpful suggestion.
39 The role of independent statements for speed-up is for example expressed by Pudlák, who
claims that ‘all concrete examples of speed-up have been constructed from concrete independent
sentences by instantiation.’ (Pudlák, 2013, p. 499)
40 Compare Heck (2009).
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we apply the truth predicate to. This becomes apparent if we look at the induction axiom
ItI of PT
−.
As a third problem we want to comment on a general objection of deflationism itself.
There is a famous argument that tries to establish the inadequacy of deflationism in con-
nection with the conservativity claim. There are different versions of this conservativeness
argument in the literature, going back to Shapiro (1998) and Ketland (1999). According
to the argument, deflationist theories are on the one hand committed to conservative ex-
tensions of PA and on the other hand to theories that adequately express the soundness
of PA. The arguments usually identify adequately expressing the soundness of PA and
proving global reflection for PA, that is ∀x (Snt(x) ∧ Prpa(x) → T(x)). To satisfy both
requirements is impossible for theories of truth that contain the T-biconditionals for arith-
metical sentences. However this identification is not necessary. There might be other ways
to adequately express the soundness of PA. In the course of proving the consistency of PA
on a cut some conservative truth theories were able to prove a global reflection principle on
a cut, that is ∀x∀y (Snt(x) ∧ C(x) ∧ C(y) ∧ Prpa(x, y) → T(x)). Now it could be argued
that global reflection on a cut is a generalization that adequately expresses a soundness
claim for the base theory. Although this new line of response is an interesting byproduct of
our investigation it cannot be developed here at length.
A fourth worry is also specific to the deflationist conception. According to deflationism
the truth predicate has no other function besides the expressive function. If speed-up is not
only part of the expressive function of truth but a sign of substance, then many theories
of truth must be deemed unacceptable by deflationist standards. Although the talk about
‘substance’ is not sufficiently clear, it is hard to see why speed-up would make truth
substantial. A possible line of reasoning for the substantialist claim would be to understand
a simplification of proofs to be explanatory. Shortening of proofs is possibly not the only
kind of simplification of proofs. There might be simplifications that give insights into why
the theorem holds. A possible simplification of this kind could be a conceptual simplifica-
tion.41 For such a simplification an explanatory understanding might be justified. However,
in the case of speed-up itself it is doubtful whether such an explanatory aspect is at work.
And even if one is convinced that speed-up is explanatory this should not be a serious
worry. Speed-up itself is not a mysterious property that would inflate truth and should
therefore be acceptable by deflationist standards. One could even go a step further and give
deflationism an instrumental twist. On this conception the usefulness of the truth predicate
would be emphasized. The truth predicate is only introduced for instrumental purposes,
such as shortening proofs. However, this expansion with the truth predicate should be
unproblematic and beyond doubt of consistency. In this case it would be justified to replace
the mysterious nonsubstantiality claim by the commitment to conservative extensions. This
enables a philosophical position that avoids a deflationist discussion whether speed-up is
merely expressive or also has an explanatory function.
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